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INTRODUCTION
The Utah Bankers' Association, by and through its
counsel, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, the Utah League of Insured
Savings Association, by and through its counsel, Prince, Yeates &
Geldzahler, and the Utah League of Credit Unions, by and through
its counsel Bruce L. Richards & Associates (collectively the
-Trade Associations") submit the following brief as amicus curiae
and urge the court to withdraw its opinion in this case dated
May 3, 1990. The Trade Associations respectfully submit that the
Court's decision is contrary to express statutory law and, if left
to stand, will have immediate serious and far-reaching negative
effects on second-mortgage lending in the State of Utah.
A.

The Court's Decision Is Contrary to the Express
Provisions of the Statute.
In its May 3, 1990 decision, the Court held that the Utah

Deficiency Statute (U.C.A. § 57-1-32 <g£ seq.) governs an action to
collect on a promissory note when the security for that promissory
note has been extinguished by foreclosure of a prior lien.

This

conclusion is in direct conflict with the language of the statute
itself, which provides:
At any time within three months after any
sale of property under a trust deed, as
hereinabove provided, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon the
obligation for which the trust deed was given
as security, and in such action the complaint
shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured bv such trust
deed, the amount for which such property was
sold, and the fair market value thereof at the
date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the
court shall find the fair market value at the
date of sale of the property sold. The court
-1-

may not render judgment for more than the
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale,
including trustee's and attorneys fees, exceeds
the fair market value of the property as of the
date of the sale. In any action brought under
this section, the prevailing party shall be
entitled to collect its costs and reasonable
attorneys fees incurred in bringing an action
under this section.
Utah Code Annot. § 57-1-32 (Emphasis added).
By its terms this statute applies only to actions to
collect the debt which is secured by the specific trust deed which
was foreclosed, not obligations secured by junior liens which were
foreclosed out at a foreclosure sale.

In the present case, the

debt sued upon by City Consumer Services was not secured by the
trust deed that was foreclosed; instead, it was secured by a
junior lien which was extinguished by the prior foreclosure of the
first lien.

Because of the prior sale under the senior trust

deed, there was never any "sale of property under [the City
Consumer Services junior] trust deed" for the Utah Deficiency
Statute to come into play.

The City Consumer Services debt was an

unsecured obligation at the time of suit and therefore was not
within the scope of the Utah Deficiency Statute.
B.

Borrowers Are Adequately Protected Under Existing Case
Law Interpreting the One-Action Rule.
Any arguable inequity to borrowers from applying the

lower court's decision is alleviated by the application to lenders
of Utah's one-action rule codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1,
which provides that

-2-

M

[t]here can be one action for the recovery of
any debt of the enforcement of any right
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate
which action must be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter."
Lenders can avoid the consequences of the one-action rule
only by satisfying the conditions for the narrow exception to the
one-action rule that a lender may independently sue on a debt that
was once secured by a lien on real property only if the security
was lost through no fault of the lender.

This exception was

stated by the Court as follows:
. . . where the security has been lost through
no fault of the mortgagee, an action may be
maintained directly upon the personal
obligation evidenced by the note without going
through the idle and fruitless procedure of
foreclosure.
Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Utah
1936).

See also Lockhart Co, v. Equitable Realty Co., 657 P.2d

1333 (Utah 1983); Utah Mortgage and Loan Co. v. Black, 618 P.2d 43
(Utah 1980).
Pursuant to this exception to the one-action rule, the
issue that *?as *ei*sed iat i:tie "tTial court level (and also briefed
before this Court) was whether City Consumer Services1 decision
not to bid at the foreclosure sale of the prior lien was a loss of
its security through no fault of City Consumer Services.

Judge

Winder of the United States District Court for the District of
Utah faced a similar issue in First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v.
Felger, 658 F.Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987).

-3-

In Felger. the bank

foreclosed on a first lien and then sued on a note which was owed
to the same bank and which was originally secured by a second lien
on the same property.

In its motion for summary judgment, the

bank stated that, at the time of foreclosure, the bank had an
appraisal which showed that the value of the property being
foreclosed did not exceed the amount owed on the first lien.
Under these facts, the federal district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the bank, holding that, as a matter of law,
the bank's action in allowing the second lien to be extinguished
by not bidding at the sale of the first priority trust deed was
not negligent or blameworthy.

I£. at 182.

The instant case presents the same one-action rule issue
and should be decided consistent with the precedents for applying
the narrow exception to the one-action rule.

Addressing the scope

of the exception to the one action rule satisfies the equitable
concerns of this Court and offers the protection to the borrower
that the one-action rule was designed to provide.

Invoking Utah's

Deficiency Statute when it was not at issue in this case sets a
dangerous precedent which is not necessary in the context of this
appeal.
C. The Court's Decision Will Have a Serious and Negative
Effect on the Second Mortgage Market.
The Court's decision in this case will have serious
repercussions for holders of second liens and will make borrowing
against the equity in property more costly or perhaps
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Assume further

the standard sales commission alone would exceed the supposed
$10/000 equity.

Under the logical extension of the Court's

decision (which would result in the fair market limitation of
Section 57-1-32 being applied to the credit union's recovery as
well as the limitations period found in that same section)/ the
credit union would be barred from collecting on its note if the
fair market value were established to be $260/000/ yet no
reasonable lender could advance the money necessary to pay off the
first lien.
The Court's decision creates significant problems for
existing junior lienholders, and these problems are magnified for
the smaller institutions.

As a result of the Court's decision,

smaller institutions may very well decide to abandon the second
mortgage market/ thus decreasing competition in that market and
increasing the cost of credit to borrowers.
D.

The Court Should Reconsider the Rationale of the Durbano
Decision.
In its decision in this case# the Court notes an

^apparent" conflict with the Court of Appeals decision in G. Adams
Limited Partnership v. Durbano, 782 P.2d 962 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989)
(a copy of which is attached).

The Trade Associations submit that

the analysis of the Court of Appeals in the Durbano decision is
precisely on point and merits great consideration by this Court.
In the Durbano decision, the Court of Appeals succinctly identified
one of the "anomalous results" of this Court's interpretation of
the deficiency statute by raising the following example:

-6-

But what if that note was not in def auJ! ""/
In appellants' view # the beneficiary would
still have only three months to bring an action
even though no action could be brought if no
default existed. If the debtor could stay
current for those three months, he or she could
then cease making any payments whatsoever with
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day of May, 1990.

RAY, QUUJNEY & NEBEKER

r
Scott H. Clark
James S. Jardine
Douglas M. Monson
Stephen C. Tingey
Attorneys for the Utah Bankers 1
Association
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Q. And on or about June 27th of 1987, when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficienthad you been convicted of a communica- ly inconclusive or inherently improbable
tions fraud felony?
that reasonable minds must have enterA. Yes, I have.
tained a reasonable doubt that the defenQ. And August 1st, 1985, had you been dant committed the crime of which he was
convicted of a theft by deception felony? convicted." Id. See also State v. Lamm,
606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980); State v.
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Had you ever communicated to Mr. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah 1&78).
Hansen anything about your criminal Defendant contends that the evidence was
insufficient to prove intent and to support
record?
the jury verdict but he provides no analyA. Yes he knew.
sis, no citation to the record, and no supQ. Did he know about that?
porting case law. We have consistent!)'
A. Yes.
held that if counsel on appeal does not
Later, the prosecutor raised the issue of
provide citations to the record, we need not
the prior convictions on cross-examination.
reach the merits of his or her substantive
Defense counsel did not object. In his closclaims. See, e.g., Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. u.
ing arguments, the prosecutor was not callSchettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah CtApp.
ing the jury's attention to new matters, but
1989).
was merely discussing matters that had
We affirm the trial court and hold that
already been before the jury twice. Furthermore, the prosecutor reminded the jury defendant's prior convictions were properly
that the evidence of the prior convictions admitted and that the prosecutor's closing
could only be used for credibility purposes. remarks did not rise to the level of prejuFinally, the possible prejudice caused by dice warranting a new trial.
the prosecutor's comments was mitigated
by the court's instruction:
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
You are instructed that the fact that a concur.
witness had been convicted of a felony
and/or convicted of any crime involving
1 0 |HYHUMBfRSY$UM>
dishonesty or false statements is to be
used by you only in weighing his credibility, and it is to be so used only if you find
and believe that such a fact indicates a
person is more likely to tell a falsehood.
"[I]f there had been any implication adverse to the defendant, the trial judge gave G. ADAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a
an appropriate cautionary instruction which
Utah limited partnership, and C.A. Fer*
it should be assumed that conscientious
rin, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
jurors would follow." State v. Trusty, 28
v.
Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113, 115 (1972).
David L. DURBANO, Paul Sachter, RichTherefore, we find that any prejudicial erard Mortensen, Steven R. Cundick, and
ror that occurred during the closing r e
Marlene H. Cundick, Defendants and
marks was harmless.
Appellants.
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
No. S80393-CA.
[5,6] In a jury trial in a criminal proCourt of Appeals of Utah.
ceeding, we review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn
Nov. 8, 1989.
therefrom in the light most favorable to
the jury verdict. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d
Action was brought to collect amount
443, 444 (Utah 1983). "We reverse a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence only due on note secured by junior trust deed

ADAMS LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. DURBANO

Utah 9 6 3

Cite as 782 ?2d 962 (UuhApp. 1989)

following nonjudicial trustee sale pursuant
to senior trust deed, which left note unsecured. The Second District Court, Weber
County, Ronald 0. Hyde, J., entered summary judgment in favor of holders of note,
and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) statutory
three-month period for commencing action
to recover balance due did not apply to
obligation secured by junior trust deed following trustee sale pursuant to senior trust
deed, and (2) untimely affidavit in opposition to summary judgment was properly
stricken.
Affirmed and remanded.
1. Mortgages e=>375
Statutory three-month period for
bringing action to recover balance due following sale of property under trust deed
did not apply to obligation secured by junior trust deed following trustee sale pursuant to senior trust deed. U.C.A.1953, 571-32.
2. Judgment <3=»185.1(1, 8)
Affidavit submitted in opposition to
summary judgment, some weeks after
hearing on motion, was properly disregarded and stricken, especially in view of representations by counsel of nonmoving party
that extra time was needed to obtain certain documentation and counsel's submitting affidavit instead of documentation.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56.
Douglas M. Durbano (Argued), John H.
Geilmann, Durbano, Smith & Reeve, Ogden, for defendants and appellants.
William Schwartz (Argued), Shawn C.
Ferrin, Hansen & Anderson, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and respondents.
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Appellants are makers on (they say guarantors of) a note held by plaintiffs and
initially secured by a trust deed. That

trust deed was junior to a trust deed which
was foreclosed nonjudicially. No proceeds
from that sale were available to apply toward the obligation evidenced by the note
at issue in this action. In due course,
plaintiffs commenced this action to collect
the full amount due on their now-unsecured
note. They were awarded summary judgment, from which this appeal is taken.
Appellants raise two basic issues. First,
they claim plaintiffs' action is statutorily
barred because it was not commenced within three months of the trustee sale conducted pursuant to the senior trust deed. Second, they claim disputes of fact exist, concerning their status and the nature of their
obligation, which make summary judgment
inappropriate. We do not agree and, accordingly, affirm.
[1] The statute on which appellants rely
provides, in part, as follows:
At any time within three months after
any sale of property under a trust deed,
as hereinabove provided, an action may
be commenced to recover the balance due
upon the obligation for which the trust
deed was given as security, and in such
action the complaint shall set forth the
entire amount of the indebtedness which
was secured by suck trust deed, the
amount for which such property was
sold, and the fair market value thereof at
the date of sale.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1986) (emphasis
added). Appellants' argument that the
statute somehow applies to bar this action
is untenable for at least four reasons.
First, the plain language of the statute, in
particular the emphasized adjectives, clearly indicates the statute limits only the
rights of the beneficiary under the trust
deed that was foreclosed—it does not affect the rights and obligations of parties to
other trust deeds. Very simply, if the beneficiary of a trust deed elects to foreclose
nonjudicially, is owed a deficiency following application of the sale proceeds, and
wishes to obtain a deficiency judgment, an
action for that purpose must be commenced
by the beneficiary under that trust deed
within three months of sale or any claim to

964
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a deficiency is waived. The statute does
not purport to address the status of obligations secured by junior trust deeds following a trustee sale pursuant to a senior
trust deed.
Second, the interpretation urged by appellants would work anomalous results in
several situations. For example, if a senior
trust deed was foreclosed nonjudicially, the
beneficiary of a junior trust deed would
have only three months to bring an action
on the note formerly secured by his or her
trust deed. But what if that note was not
in default? In appellants' view, the beneficiary would still have only three months to
bring an action even though no action could
be brought if no default existed. If the
debtor could stay current for those three
months, he or she could then cease making
any payments whatsoever with absolute
impunity.1

excess of the obligation secured by the
trust deed which was foreclosed.
Finally, policy considerations are at odds
with appellants* position. Nonjudicial foreclosure of a trust deed spares the beneficiary the cost of a lawsuit and the delay
and uncertainty of a six-month redemption
period. It is appropriate, however, to impose a price on these benefits. The price is
chiefly in the form of restrictions on the
availability of a deficiency judgment The
action must be brought almost immediately
and the deficiency amount will be calculated with reference to the fair market value
of the property rather than the amount bid.
See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1986). It is
fair to extract this price from the beneficiary who made the decision to take the
nonjudicial shortcut. It would be grossly
unfair to saddle a beneficiary under a junior trust deed with one aspect of that burden even though he or she did not participate in the decision and received no corresponding benefit.

Third, the cases relied on by appellants
are wholly inapplicable. One admittedly
involves the beneficiary under a junior
trust deed, but it was that beneficiary who
foreclosed nonjudicially and then sought to
bring first an action for deficiency judgment—and then such an action thinly disguised as one for breach of contract—beyond three months from the date of sale.
Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985)
(per curiam). Another case actually concerns the effect of a typographical error in
a notice of sale. Concepts, Inc. v. First
Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158
(Utah 1987) (per curiam). The opinion
merely observes in passing that § 57-1-32
"requires an action to recover the balance
due upon the obligation for which the
trust deed was given as security to be
commenced within three months after the
sale of the property under trust deed/' id.
at 1159 n. 1 (emphasis added), in no way
even implying the strained interpretation
appellants urge. The third case, Randall
v. Valley Title, 681 P.2d 219 (Utah 1984),
concerns multiple trust deeds, but deals
only with the disposition of sale proceeds in

[2] The remaining question is whether
the court properly granted summary judgment to plaintiffs. We have carefully reviewed the entire record. Plaintiffs' motion was supported with several detailed
affidavits setting forth facts which, if uncontroverted, would clearly entitle plaintiffs to judgment. Appellants responded
with brief affidavits setting forth two conelusory statements and certain irrelevant
observations as to the value of the property. In essence, the facts detailed in plaintiffs' affidavits remained uncontroverted
for purposes of Utah R.Civ.P. 56, and judgment for plaintiffs, on the record before
the court, was appropriate. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Mel by, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah
1985) ("An affidavit which merely reflects
the affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions
and which fails to state evidentiary facts is
insufficient to create an issue of fact").

1. Appellants observe that many trust deeds, including the one involved in this case, provide
that any default in obligations secured by a
senior lien will be deemed a default of the

obligations secured by such trust deeds. This is
true. However, many do not. One example is
the standard short-form trust deed widely used
in this state.

In sum, the trial court ruled correctly in
denying appellants' motion to dismiss.

JOHNSON v. DEPT. OF EMPLOYMENT SEC.

Utah 965

Qte as 782 P.2d 965 (UtahApp. 1989)

Appellants submitted an extensive affidavit some weeks after the hearing which
would make the question a closer one, especially concerning the amount of the judgment. The trial court disregarded the affidavit in entering judgment and later formally entered its ruling striking the affidavit The court explained its decision in
these terms:
This matter was heard on a motion for
summary judgment. Counsel for the defendants stated that he would be able to
substantiate his defense if he was allowed some time to obtain the paper
work from Commercial Security Bank.
This additional time was granted over
plaintiffs' objection. When the additional time allocation had run out, defendants' counsel contacted this judge by
telephone stating he needed additional
time because of the switchover from
Commer[cial] Security Bank to Key
Bank, they were having difficulty locating the documents in question. This additional time was informally granted.
Later, rather than supply the Court with
the purported documentation, defendants
submit an affidavit, which sets up a new
argument based on opinion and conclusions in regard to the transaction. The
documentation that defendants' counsel
stated he would submit to the Court has
never been submitted; and no authority
was granted for the submission of Additional affidavits and/or argument.
We see no abuse of discretion in the court's
treatment of the untimely affidavit, especially in view of this explanation.

Kevin R. JOHNSON, Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY and Morton Thiokol,
Inc., Respondents.
No. 880703-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 8, 1989.
Claimant sought review of denial of
unemployment benefits by Board of Review of the Industrial Commission. The
Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1)
positive drug test which revealed marijuana metabolites in employee's blood constituted just cause for dismissal which precluded employee from receiving unemployment compensation benefits, and (2) Court
would not consider issue raised for first
time on appeal of whether Utah Drug and
Alcohol Testing Act violated constitutional
guarantees of equal protection, and whether Act was unconstitutionally implied to
employee.
Affirmed.
1 Administrative Law and Procedure
<S=>796
Social Security and Public Welfare
*=>652
Court of Appeals will not disturb application of law by the Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission to its factual findings unless its determination exceeds
bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d).

The judgment is affirmed. The case is
remanded for a determination of the attorney fees to which plaintiffs are entitled in
view of their success on appeal. See
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development 2. Administrative Law and Procedure
Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980);
*=>386
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1986).
Administrative agencies have power to
create rules and regulations which conform
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
to authorizing statute and do not depart
concur.
from it.
(O f HY«UMBlRSY$TtM>

3. Social Security and Public Welfare
«=»388.5
Employee's consumption of illegal
drugs, whether on or off duty and whether

